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THE LAW OF RADIO COMMUNICA-
TION WITH PARTICULAR REFER-
ENCE TO A PROPERTY RIGHT
IN A RADIO WAVE LENGTHt
JAMES PATRICK TAUGHER*
W HAT, in Heaven's name, as this is merely the beginning of these won-
ders, will be the end of them? To whom, eventually, will one be able
to speak when the radio has grown up, has thrown aside its swaddling
clothes and become a middle-aged and accepted fact? .... .the audience of
the person who sits in the broadcasting station will not only be on this earth,
but on numerous earths; . . . . in time the radio will tune in the beyond,
and one 'night, very soon, millions of astonished listeners will hear Caruso sing
again from the plane to which.he has been transferred by what is known as
death..... .The voices of long departed people will be heard again-Dickens,
Thackeray, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Mark Twain, Lincoln, Alexander Hamilton,
Gladstone, Salisbury.
And as for the living, anyone with imagination can see in the greater per-
fection of this miracle a series of silent revolutions which will do away with
the novel, the newspaper, the theater, and the concert room.
Cos ao HAMILTON to Station WGN, Chicago
Within the -memory of living men the scientist has added to the
ever-increasing number of legal problems. Fulton, Stephenson, Morse,
Bell and the Wright Brothers have, in turn, created new fields in
which the law has been called upon to function. By easy extensions
the common law principles were made to fit each new development
until terra firma was forsaken and the air above was invaded by in-
quisitive man. Then, indeed, the ancient principle of law, Cu jus est
solum, e=us est uSque as cwlum et ad inferos, 1 had to give way to
the necessities of aerial navigation,2 and the property owner saw him-
t EDITOR's Nomr: Lack of space prevents the complete presentation of Mr.
Taugher's article in this issue. Parts II and III will appear in the June num-
ber of the current volume.
* Member of the Milwaukee Bar.
1 Co. Litt. 4a; 2 Blackstone's Comm. i8; 3 Kent's Comm. (I4th Ed.) *40.
See Butler v. Frontier Telephone Ca. (i9o6) 186 N.Y. 486, 79 N.E. 716.
'Carl Zollmann, "Air Space Rights," Am. Law Journ., Nov., '18.
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self relegated to a contemplation of the visible freehold. And today,
radio communication, through its four stages of growth-wire-teleg-
raphy, wire-telephony, wireless-telegraphy, and wireless-telephony (or
radio)- has attained to an invisible trespass and assault upon the same
freeholder's land and person. The stoutest building, the very earth
itself, is pierced by this new medium of commerce which, in less than
a decade, has presented a legal field as complex as it is unique.
Whether the owner of broad acres is entitled to all the radio energy
that goes with the soil,3 the manifold problems of radio patents, in-
ternational radio law, copyright in radio communications (in extenso),
will not be discussed in this paper. Suffice it to say that the legal
problems now existing in reference to the operation of radio broad-
casting stations are sufficiently perplexing in themselves to merit at-
tention and this discussion will be confined to a brief examination of
those problems.
Radio broadcasting stations are plants through which programs,
messages, and information are disseminated to various privately owned
receiving sets by means of a wave of electro-magnetic energy, sent
into the ether through an "antenna" or aErial wire, after being gener-
ated in the plant itself. By means of coils and condensers contained
in the receiving sets, the sets are "tuned" or adjusted to the incoming
carrier-wave. It is the function of the receiving sets to retranslate the
electro-magnetic energy into sound.
Each broadcasting station operates on what is called a "wave-length,"
i.e., the frequency, expressed either in kilocycles or meters,4 with
which the carrier-waves are sent by the transmitting apparatus into
the ether. By means of adjustments, as prompted by meter readings,
this frequency can be kept constant. It is therefore possible for several
broadcasting stations to operate in approximately the same locality
at the same time, and for receiving sets to receive the wave of only
one of them at a time, by tuning first to one and then to the other
frequency-so long as the stations retain their respective wave-lengths.
Within the range of the average radio receiving set broadcasting
stations must operate on a wave-length somewhere between the limits
of 202.6 and 545.1 meters, or on a frequency somewhere between 1,480
and 55o kilocycles. 5 It has been determined that stations within the
geographical range of each other's carrier-wave should operate as
much as ten kilocycles apart6 to prevent a shrill "heterodyning" whistle
'Hearings on Radio Control, S i. and S i754, p. 248.
'"Broadcasting," by Ralph Bown, Institute of Radio Engrs., in Encyc. Britt.
(13th Ed.).
'Hearings on Radio Control, p. 15. Act of 1912; U. S. Comp St., 1916, Sec.
ioloo-ioiio, Sec. IOLO4, Reg. No. 15.
Encyc. Britt., supra.
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in the receiving sets, caused by the superimposition of a wave of one
frequency upon another of the same or a similar frequency except in
cases of stations located within a very few miles of each other, in
which case as much as thirty to fifty kilocycles separation is neces-
sary.'
In the year 1926 there were some five hundred stations in operation
in the United States, with more than four hundred aspirants clamoring
for licenses. The available wave-length "channels" number only eighty-
nine" and it has been computed that no more than three hundred and
thirty-one stations-can operate in the United States without wave inter-
ference. 9 It is therefore obvious that the proper safeguards against
interference could not be taken when, instead of three hundred and
thirty-one, over five hundred stations were licensed for broadcasting.
Fourteen of these wave-length "channels" are required for foreign
stations in the Western Hemisphere.1" A more or less satisfactory
assignment was worked out by the Secretary of Commerce as fol-
lows: (a) by dividing the time during which two or more stations
could use an available wave-length, thereby allowing several stations
to be grouped on one frequency in the same locality; and (b) by
assigning the same wave-length to stations separated as far apart as
possible geographically so that their carrier-waves should not have suffi-
cient power under normal conditions seriously to interfere with each
other. It was the pride of the radio industry that until 1926 it had
been to a large extent self-regulating, its efficient functioning being
discussed and agreed upon, as to most of the regulatory features
deemed necessary, at annual conferences rather than imposed by gov-
ernmental authority."'
In April, 1926, Judge Wilkerson, in the Zenith case' 2 disturbed
the comparative security of the broadcasting situation by declaring that
the Secretary of Commerce had no power to compel a station to use
'Judge Wilson, in Chi. Tribune Co. v. Oak Leaves Broadcasting Co., et al.,
ordered a forty kilocycle separation to be maintained between the wave-lengths
of the two Chi. stations, WGN and WGES (Def.) See Chi. Trib., Nov. I8, 1926.
'Radio Control, p. 15.
'Radio Broadcast, Vol. IX, p. 475. (1926).
0 There is no international agreement at present with regard to the use of
wave-lengths. The last international convention on radio was held in London
in 1912 but no attempt was made to apportion wave-lengths. (Treaty printed
in full in Precis de Reglementation des Communications Radio-electriques, p. Ii
[1924, Avril-Juin], Brun et Gourvenec) (Radio Control, p. 264). The conven-
tion saw the impossibility of totally eliminating interference, so the Treaty of
July 8, 1913, (38 Stat. 1672) was the result. (See Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co.,
286 Fed. lO5 [1923].
"See Hoover in Radio Control, p. 83.
2 U.S. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F. (2nd) 614 (1926).
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only the wave-length assigned to it. Recently, there has developed
among several of the stations a tendency to disregard the wave-lengths
assigned to them and to embarrass the division of channels in either
or both of two ways: by greatly increasing the power used to put the
carrier-wave on the air, or by abandoning the assigned channel alto-
gether, and by adopting another which is identical with that assigned
to some other station, or so close to it as to cause destructive inter-
ference.
Such a situation gives rise to the question of a station's rights to
priority of the air, and the further question of the -legal responsibility
of the offending station which has destroyed the program sent out by
another station. For the purpose of this discussion, the questions will
be divided as follows: What is the responsibility of the offending
station to the government? Is there any common law liability as be-
tween stations? What will be the effect of the Radio Act of 1927 as
viewed in the light of the answers to these questions?
I. RESPONSIBILITY TO THE GOVERNMENT
Previous to the enactment of the Radio Act of .1927 the only Federal
Statute governing radio was the Act of August 13, 1912, ch. 28713
In brief, it provides that all stations using wireless apparatus for com-
munication between the several states or with foreign countries shall
do so under a license, revocable for cause, issued by the Secretary
of Commerce; that stations shall operate on stated wave-lengths; that,
for wilful or malicious interference with communication of another
station, the offender shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punish-
able by fine. As will become evident in the course of this discussion,
the Act is a penal statute and does not purport to regulate civil rights
as such.
This Act was intended to control radio telegraphy only, since radio
broadcasting, as we now know it, was unknown in 1912.14 Never-
theless, Section No. i of the Act clearly reaches broadcasting insofar
as a license is made a prerequisite to operation.' 5
"Fed. Stats. Ann., Vol. 9, P. 523; Barne's Fed. Code, 1919, p. 2317; U.S. Comp.
St. 1916, Sec. ioiOo-ioiio. The constitutionality -of federal control will be dis-
cussed under a later heading.
"The first broadcasting may be said to have been the enterprise of Station
KDKA, at East Pittsburgh, in dispatching into the night the election returns of
Nov., 1g2o.
U.S. Comp. St. ioioo-"A person, corporation ..... shall not use . ...
any apparatus for radio communication . . . . except under a license . ...
granted by the Secretary of Commerce." That language is broad enough to cover
the present situation and so the Attorney General held. (35 Op. Att'y-Gen. 127
(1926) in answer to several questions 'propounded by Mr. Hoover in June, 1926,
after the Zenith decision.)
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But with Section i, the utility of the Act as a means of control,
ceased. Once having brought a station into being the authority of the
Secretary of Commerce became a nullity except to render information
for the indictment of broadcasting stations which operate without a
license and those which maliciously interfere with other stations in
violation of Section 5 of the Act. Whatever doubts were had as to
the Secretary's authority were set at rest by Judge Wilkerson's opinion
in United States v. Zenith Radio Corporation.'6 The defendants were
indicted for operating their station on a wave-length and at a time not
authorized by their license.1 7 The court held for the defendants, reason-
ing that a delegation by Congress to the Secretary of Commerce of the
power and discretion to make regulations other than those stipulated in
the Act' without specifying some test for the exercise of that dis-
cretion would be unconstitutional as the delegation of power to create
a penal offense, that proper interpretation demanded the presumption
that Congress would not intend an unconstitutional provision; and that,
therefore, the Secretary of Commerce was not given power to make
such regulations as appeared in the defendant's license. But even if
the Zenith decision were erroneous in stating that the Act of 1912
contained an unguided discretion that was practically legislative, Regu-
lation Fifteenth of the Act 9 permits stations engaged in the transac-
tion of "bona fide commercial business" to use the wave-lengths ca-
pable of being tuned in by the average radio receiver, i.e., wave-lengths
in excess of 200 meters zithout an assignment of a wave-length by
the Secretary of Commerce. In view of that regulation the Secretary
of Commerce is without power to assign a wave-length, if broadcast-
ing stations are engaged in commercial business.
There are two grounds on which broadcasting stations could be
found to be within the class not required to obtain the assignment
of a wave-length: (a) The modern broadcasting station is a result
of "experimentation in connection with the development and manu-
"12 Fed. (2nd) 614 (1926).
'The license provided that the station should use a wave-length of 322.4
meters "only on Thursday nights from 1o to 12 P.M., central standard time, and
then only when the use of this period is not desired by the Gen. Elec. Co.'s
Denver Station."--(Copy of license at end of opinion.)
"Sec. 2 of the Act: "Every such license shall be in such form as the Sec.
of Comm. shall determine, and shall contain such restrictions . . . . on and
subject to which the license is granted."
"Act of '12, Reg. x5th: "No private or commercial station not engaged in the
transaction of bona fide commercial business by radio communication or in ex-
perimentation in connection with the development and manufacture Of radio ap-
paratus for commercial purposes shall use a transmitting wave-length exceeding
200 meters-except by special authority of the Sec. of Commerce, contained in
the license of the station.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
facture of radio apparatus" inasmuch as radio has been a growth
through research and experiment in the laboratories of the large com-
mercial and manufacturing concerns. Broadcasting stations (b) are
undoubtedly "engaged in the transaction of bona fide commercial busi-
ness," and could for that reason be placed within the priviliged class.
Certainly, broadcasting stations are not eleemosynary institutions
operated with the sole idea of spreading the philanthropic good cheer
of their benevolent owners. Human nature is not so constituted as
to spend $50,000 a year 2 for the upkeep of the average station merely
for the idle delectation of millions of unknown and unseen listeners.
The outpourings of the ethereal cornucopia have a baser and more
utilitarian purpose in the main. A station's monetary value, though not
to be computed in dollars and cents is actual and tangible and results
almost exclusively from its advertising possibilities. Some five or six
years ago, in the hey-day of radio's youth, ingenious minds speculated
on ways and means of maintaining these costly stations. Some pro-
posed a tax on all radio apparatus, the income to be divided propor-
tionately among the broadcasters.2 1  Some have suggested and put
into practice the selling of annual box seats in an "invisible theater."
But most, if not all, present-day stations are organized to sell part of
their time on the air to trade-mark advertisers who pay as high as
$600 an hour to present their entertainers on the radio.22 This, too
is indirect advertising, gained from the announcements between musi-
cal offerings, that "these are the So-and-So Entertainers (or this is
the So-and-So Hour), sponsored by the So-and-So Company, makers
of So-and-So Products." The rates of the charges for advertising
time on the air vary with the hours of the day or evening, as it is
known that the size of the audience changes with the different times
of day.23  The rates also vary with the character of the stations and
the number of listeners that will be reached. Thus, the basis for the
rates is very much like the basis for an advertising charge in a news-
paper.2 "4 Indeed, the business of broadcasting is very much like the
publication of a magazine, such as the Saturday Evening Post. A large
' Radio Control, p. 237.
' Precis de Reglenientation des Communications Radio-electriques, p. i (Avril-
Juin, 1924, Brun et Gourvenec).
'Radio Control, p. 92. Sec. pp. 20, 45, 54, 72, 92, 237.
' Radio Control, same pages.
'Radio Control, p. 93. The classification of stations on the basis of the in-
terests owning the same is as follows: stores, most of them dealing in radio
supplies, 124 stations; schools and colleges, 94; churches, 43; publishers of news-
papers and magazines, 35; manufacturers, 30, of whom 20 are manufacturers
of radio apparatus; states, counties and municipalities, 15; banks, ins. co's, etc.,
15; hotels, I; societies, ii; 22 scattering stations. Radio Control, p. 20.
LAW OF RADIO COMMUNICATION
quantity of entertainment and instruction is furnished the public in
the one case by broadcasting programs and in the other by the pub-
lication of stories and articles. In both cases the entertainment and
instruction are made the vehicle for carrying advertising to the public,
and the public is induced to listen to or see the advertising by the
entertainment and instruction which it receives. The only difference
is that in the case of the Saturday Evening Post the subscriber pays a
very small charge per copy and in the case of broadcasting the listener
pays nothing (except the outlay for his receiving set, which in most
cases does not go to the broadcasting station). This difference is
only superficial, however, because the trifling charge paid for a copy
of the Post is but a small percentage of its cost and is charged partly
for the reason that it is necessary to obtain second-class postal rates,
and partly, it may be supposed, to insure that the magazine will reach
only the readers who are interested enough to read it to pay a slight
sum for it.
Similarly, the Daily News Almanac furnishes an even more perfect
analogy. It is a publication containing entertainment and instruction
which is distributed free for the sake of the advertising.The French look upon broadcasting as an advertising scheme de-
signed principally to stimulate the sales of radio equipment offered
on the market by the broadcaster. As was stated in the Revue Juri-
dique Internationale de la Radio-electricite (Avril-Juin, 1926):
Mais lorsque, comme aux Etats-Unis, ou en France, il n'existe pas
de contribution obligatoire etablie par la loi, la question de la perception
est (plus).delicate . . . dans la plupart des cas les groupments faisant
les emissions subventionnes par des dons prives ou par un prelevement
conventionnel, librement consenti par les industriels et commercantes,
sur les ventes d'appareils et accessaires fabriques par ou pour la societe
d'emission elle-meme." L'emission radiophonique n'est plus dans ce
dernier cas, qu'un mode de publicite destine a permettre l'ecoulement
de produits dont ils suscitent des modes d'utilization sans cesse renou-
veles.
Judge Wilkerson, in United States v. Zenith Radio Corporation,2r
stated loosely that broadcasting was not "commercial business" within
the meaning of the exception in Regulation Fifteenth of the Act of
1912 allowing "commercial stations" to choose their own wave-length
in the 200-500 meter band. But the opinion of Acting Attorney-Gen-
eral Donovan 26 is to the contrary and seems to be the better view and
the view adopted by the Secretary of Commerce. His opinion was
based upon Wetmark v. Bamburger27 and Rernick v. American Auto
12 Fed. (2nd) 614 (1926).
35 Op. Att'y-Gen. 126 (July 8, 1926).
291 Fed. 776.
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Accessories Co.,28 which was to the effect that a radio program was a
"public performance for profit" within the meaning of the Copyright
Laws. From these cases it would seem that an indirect charge causes
the performance to be considered one for profit. The defendant, in
each case, by advertising its name at each performance, was likely to
derive benefit by the increased patronage of the listeners. The indirect
benefit derived may be as great if not greater than the profit derived
from an admission fee and is certainly sufficient to bring the cases
within the statutory requirements of an infringement. Radio per-
formances may be philanthropic in some cases, but where, as in these
cases, the defendant charged the expenses to the general business ex-
penses the conclusion that the performance was for profit is Justifi-
able.2
9
The authors of the Radio Act of 1927 saw the growth of "com-
mercial" broadcasting so clearly that they attempted to apply to radio
the same test that is now applied in the States generally to public utili-
ties. The Act compels, practically, the issuance of a certificate of
=298 Fed. 628-On appeal, 5 Fed. (2nd) 411. The Wetmark case involved
a suit for injunction restraining further infringement of a copyrighted musical
composition. The alleged infringement consisted of broadcasting a song from
defendant's store. Each performance started and concluded with an announce-
ment that the entertainment was being furnished by the defendant. It was held,
that there was a public performance for profit, the performance was of a public
nature, being heard by the general public by means of private radio apparatus.
True, the listeners were not charged any fee. But it has been held that the
rendition of a copyrighted song by a restaurant keeper's orchestra, although
patrons were not charged therefor, constituted an infringement, the court reason-
ing that a charge in fact was made by virtue of the comparatively higher price
asked because of the entertainment. Herbert v. Shanley Co. (1917) 242 U.S.
591, 37 Sup. Ct. 232. Similarly, a proprietor of a moving picture theater was
liable for an infringement by his organist in playing a copyrighted song during
the performance. Harns v. Cohen (D.C. 1922) 279 Fed. 276.
'In the Remick case the bill alleged that "defendant manufactured and sold
radio products and supplies for pecuniary profit; that it maintained a radio
broadcasting station . . . . as a means of advertising and publicity, and as a
means of bringing its radio products . . . . to the attention of the public, and
of stimulating the sale thereof, and that the maintenance of the station was
effective for these purposes; that the license . . . . to operate as a commercial
station was issued on application to operate for commercial purposes; that de-
fendant announced its programs to the public by newspaper advertisements and
bulletins . . . . ; that defendant charged on its books the radio broadcasting
service to its advertising and publicity account." The Copyright Act of March
4, 1907, c. 320 Sec. I, 35 Stat. 1075 (Comp. St. Sec. 9517) was held applicable on
proof of these allegations. "The artist is consciously addressing a great, though
unseen and widely scattered, audience, and is, therefore, participating in.a public
performance for profit." (p. 412). See the first count of the U.S. Att'y's in-
formation in U.S. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 Fed. (2nd) 624 (1926). See, also,
Col. Law Rev., Jan. '24, p. 90.
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public convenience or necessity in advance of the obtaining of a
license for radio communication. 31
The above detailed consideration of radio's commercial aspect is
deemed necessary by reason of the fact that such commercial business
practically emasculates the Act of 1912 and leaves the station owner
to choose his wave-length at will, subject to no Federal control what-
ever (apart from indictment for malicious interference) when once
the requisite license has been procured.32 In brief, the Attorney Gen-
eral33 has denied the administrative power of the Department of Com-
merce on matters of division of hours of operation, wave-length, ap-
propriation, duration of license, and limitation of power.34 And by
the decision in Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., Inc. 35 the Secretary of
Commerce can be compelled by mandamus to issue the license since
such issuing is a mere ministerial act, the Act of 1912 not indicating
in what cases the license should or should not be issued. Thus, it is
apparent that judicial decision has emasculated the Act of 1912.
By the Act 'of 1912 Congress did not take over exclusive juris-
diction of the subject of radio communication; civil rights under the
common law8 (as well as any civil rights created by state legislatures)
remain unaffected. The statute, being a penal act,3 7 is best under-
stood in this connection by examining other regulatory and penal acts
which have been held not to exclude state law and state rights. As
was stated generally in the Texas Cattle Fever cases:
Before Congress will be held to have taken over an entire field
of interstate commerce to the exclusion of all state law on the subject,
it nust clearly and affirmatively appear from its enactment that it
intends to do so; there must be a direct conflict between the federal
legislation and the state law.38
'Radio Control, p. lO4.
'See both U.S. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 Fed. (2nd) 614 (1926) and Act
of 1912, Reg. 2nd: "In addition to the normal sending wave-length all stations,
except as provided hereinafter ..... .may use other . . . .wave-lengths, etc."
3 35 Op. Att'y-Gen. 131-2 (1926).
'See Reg. I4th, Act of 1912.
"286 Fed. 3OO3 (1923).
Discussed, post, II.
'The Zenith decision was confined to the principle that, in a criminal in-
dictment, based upon the penal provisions of a Federal statute, an administra-
tive ruling, by a strict construction, cannot add to the terms of the statute and
make conduct criminal which it leaves untouched.
'Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Harris, 254 U.S. 412, 582 L. Ed. 1377,
1382: "But the intent to supersede the exercise by the state of its police power
as to matters not covered by the federal legislation is not to be inferred from
the mere fact that Congress has seen fit to circumscribe its regulation and to
occupy a limited field. In other words, unless the act of Congress, fairly
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The language in Reid v. Colorado9 is typical of the principle in point:
So that when the entire subject of the transportation of livestock
from one state to another is taken under direct national supervision,
and a system devised by which diseased cattle may be excluded from
interstate commerce, all local or state regulations in respect of such
matters and covering the same ground will cease to have any force,
whether formally abrogated or not; and such rules and regulations
as Congress-may lawfully prescribe or authorize will alone control. 39
This language is particularly applicable to the present status of radio
communication under. the Act of i9i2.4o To the Congress, by its penal
act, has not as yet deprived the states of their control over radio by a
"paramount, universal and exclusive" rule. Such common law rules
as may govern interstation operation must control wave-length dis-
putes untrammelled by Congressional dictates. To the same effect are
the Food and Drug Act cases.41
Until 189o and 1899 the states might allow an interstate navigable
river to be obstructed because Congress had not exercised its para-
mount control over the navigable waters, although each case recognized
th'at Congress had the power to do so. 42
Even after Congress passed the Act of i89o it was held that federal
authorization did not relieve a person from getting the municipality's
consent to the erection of an obstruction in the interstate river.43 The
cases construing the Act of 189 o emphasize the point that federal and
state powers remain concurrent until Congress has assumed exclusive
control.
4 4
From the preceding brief discussion it is apparent that- where a
federal statute has made no provision as to civil rights, it has been
interpreted, is in actual conflict with the law of the state." Missouri, Kan. &
Tex. Ry. Co. v. Haber, 169 U.S. 613, 42 L. Ed. 613, is the case quoted above.
Therefore, a Kansas statute which did nothing, more than establish a rule
of civil liability in that state did not affect regulation of inter-state commerce
made by Congress by a penal act. The police power of the state stood supreme
in its sphere because Congress had not imposed a paramount, universal and
exclusive rule. Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 47 L. Ed. 1O8 (1902).
"
0 Vide discussion, ante, 43: appropriation of wave-lengths by station owners
free from government direction or control.
"Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 56 L. Ed. 1182 and cases cited. Commonwealth
v. Moore, 214 Mass. I9, OO N.E. 1071 (913). For the purposes of this portion
of the discussion the Radio Act of 1927 is considered as not yet in existence.
" Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245; Cooley v. Port Wordens,
12 How. 299; Mobile Co., Kimble, lO2 U.S. 691; Wheeling Bridge Case, 13 How.
421.
' Cummings v. Chi., 188 U.S. 410; Montgomery v. Portland, 19o U.S. 89.
"Same, re: Fed. and State Employers' Liability Acts. (Negligence and Pro-
duction Cost differences) Winfield v. N.Y. Cent. & N.R.R. Co., 216 N.Y. 284,
iio N.E. 614, (915); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Louisville and Nashville Ry.,
270 Ill. 399. (915).
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held not to exclude state law on the subject which is not in direct con-
flict. The corollary to this is also true, i.e., that when Congress has
attempted to take over the entire field to the exclusion of state law
or civil rights, it has done so by specific provisions relating to such
civil rights. 45
A license to use an apparatus for radio communication under the
Act of 1912 does not give a licensee any right to interfere with the
broadcasting of another. As was stated above, substantially the only
effect of the license is to avoid a penalty under Section I of the Act.
Further than that Congress has not assumed control. The business
of broadcasting is a perfectly lawful business, not very much different
from the publication of a magazine, or the furnishing of entertainment
by means of theaters or moving picture shows. Neither the state
legislatures nor Congress, therefore, has power completely to forbid
a person to engage in this business.46 Congress may, of course, pro-
tect government radio communication by reserving a band of wave-
lengths for use by government stations and, under its power to regulate
interstate commerce, may protect stations engaged in interstate com-
merce from interference by amateurs and others. But whether it be
interstate commerce or not, being a lawful business, its pursuit can-
not be totally forbidden, or regulated to such an extent as to make its
pursuit impossible.
The distinction between businesses which are lawful in themselves
and may not be forbidden either by the state legislatures or by Con-
gress and businesses which are of such nature that a state legislature
may totally forbid them is of such an elementary character that it
would be purposeless to discuss it at length. Suffice it to say that
a state may, under its police power, totally forbid the manufacture
and sale of liquor (even before the Eighteenth Amendment), gambling
houses, pool-rooms, etc. Naturally, therefore, a person having a license
to conduct a saloon, gambling house, or a pool-hall cannot set up as
a defense this license when by state law the pursuit of these occupa-
tions is forbidden.
On the other hand, a lawful calling, whether licensed or not, may
not be so forbidden. For example, the following occupations, among
others, are licensed: physicians, mid-wives, optometrists, real estate
brokers, chiropractors, nurses, dentists, pharmacists, dealers in securi-
ties and barbers. None of these licenses has ever been held to be merely
permissive. On the contrary, each has been held to involve a pursuit
" See the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Fed. Employers' Liability Act, Inter-
state Commerce Act, Fed. Trade Comm. Act and the Telegraph Act.
"The Act of i9gi gave licenses to all who demanded them. Hoover v. Inter-
city Radio Co., Inc., 286 Fed. 1003 (1923).
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that is lawful and the right to which may not be taken away without
due process of law. This principle has been recognized in a long line
of cases in the United States Supreme Court.
4 7
The holding of the license, however, has nothing to do with the
rivil rights of the parties in any of these cases. While it is necessary
.hat a person should have a license before he will have any standing
:n court,48 it is not the license which grants or determines civil rights.
A physician may enjoin another physician from interfering with his
practice by certain unlawful methods; while he must have a license
in order to have any standing in court, his right to enjoin the inter-
ference does not arise from or have anything to do with the license.
And so a license to conduct a radio station does not determine the civil
rights of stations inter se. It simply gives the stations existence.49
The special authority given to broadcasting stations by the Secretary
of Commerce would not affect civil rights any more than the special
authorization of the Secretary of War to an individual to place an
obstruction in a navigable river. The license issued at present by the
Department of Commerce amounts to nothing more than a perfunctory
permission to broadcast. Therefore, the issuing of a second license
to use a wave-length already in use by a first licensee could have no
effect on the permission of the first licensee to broadcast, the use or
abuse of a wave-length being governed solely, at present, by common
law principles (if any such exist). 5°
A state or municipality may enjoin or prevent the erection of ob-
structions to navigation in navigable waters of the United States even
though such obstructions have been affirmatively authorized by the
Secretary of War after a hearing.51 Now, as stated in Hoover v. Inter-
city Radio Co.,5 2 the Secretary of Commerce has no power or discre.
tion to refuse a license. Under Section i of the Act of 1912, the desig-
nation of the normal sending and receiving wave-length is made by the
applicant and not by the Secretary of Commerce. The effect of a
license, therefore, in which a wave-length is designated, does not repre-
' Lehinann v. State Board of Pub. ACconnting, 263 U.S. 394; Dent v. W.Va.,
129 U.S. 114; Hawker v. N.Y., 170 U.S. 187; Reetz v. Mich., i88 U.S. 505.
'A physician must have a license before he can sue for fees. (147.14 (2)
Wis. Stats. 1925.)
Post, III.
'It is still supposed that the Radio Act of 1917 is not in existence.
6 Cummings v. Chi., (1902) 188 U.S. 410, 47 L. Ed. 525; Montgomery v. City
of Portland, (19o3) 190 U.S. 89, 47 L. Ed., 965; Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co.
v. Ohio (x897) 165 U.S. 365, 366, 368, 41 L. Ed., 747, 748, i7 Sup. Ct. Rep.
357; Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. I, 31 L. Ed. 629, 8 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 8I.
2286 Fed. 1OO3 (1923).
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sent by any possible stretch of the imagination a finding that that wave-
length or any other will not interfere with wave-lengths used by
others.3
In the case of special authorization from the Secretary of War to
erect an obstruction to navigation it may with more force be con-
tended that the Secretary of War, under a federal statute, has made
a finding that is conclusive against cities and individuals. Yet, (as
in the cases cited, supra) it has been held that even an individual hav-
ing such an authorization is not exempted from liability to the state or
the municipality (including suits for injunction) unless he has first
complied with ordinances and statutes and has obtained the necessary
consent.
The rights accorded to telegraph companies by the Act of Congress
(1866) do not relieve such companies from respect for the rights of
property, public or private, of others.5 4 In City of St. Louis v. Western
Union Tel. Co.55 iMr. Justice Brewer said:
It is a misconception, however, to suppose that the franchise granted
by the Act of 1866 carries with it the unrestricted right to appropriate
the public property of a state ..... While a grant from one govern-
ment may supersede and abridge franchises and rights held at the
will of its grantor, it cannot abridge any property rights of a public
character created by the authority of another sovereignty ..... .No
matter how broad and comprehensive might be the terms in which
the franchise was granted it would be confessedly subordinate to the
right of the individual not to be deprived of his property without just
compensation 5
Again, a license protects a licensee against complaint on the part of
the public at large but it does not relieve him of liability to an indi-
vidual who sustains some special injury.56
Query :-Are there, then, private rights in a radio wave-length apart
from rights got by the license and which will govern the rights of
stations inter se?
'See Sec. No. 2, also.
148 U.S. 92, 37 L. Ed. 380.
' Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. I, 24 L. Ed. 708;
St. Louis & San Fran. R.R. Co. v. So. West. Tel. and Tel. Co., (C.C.A. 8th
Ct.) 121 Fed. 276.
37 C.J. 243. Same, Kurtz v. Southern Pac. Co., 8o Ore. 213, 155 Pac. 267,
156 Pac. 794; Sandstrom v. Oregon-Wash. R. v. Nay. Co., 75 Ore. 159, 146
Pac. 803: Authority to occupy a street, whether obtained directly from the
Legislature or from a local municipality, only protects the company to the ex-
tent of the public right or easement in the street and leaves the company to
deal with private rights as in other cases." Muhlker v. N.Y. & Harlem R.R.
Co., 197 U.S. 544, 25 Sup Ct., 522, 49 L. Ed., 872.
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To recapitulate:-
(i) No broadcasting station may lawfully operate without a license,
according to Section i of the Act of 1912, and yet the Department
of Commerce may be compelled to issue the license under the decision
in the Intercity Radio Case.
(2) The Secretary of Commerce has no discretion to assign any
particular wave-length, nor to stipulate any division of time in the
license, (as was brought out in the Zenith decision and the Opinion
of the Attorney-General based on Regulation Fifteenth of the Act
of 1912.
(3) The Act of 1912 is a penal statute; it is to be strictly construed
and does not purport to regulate civil rights.
(4) Congress, by the Act of 1912, has not assumed exclusive
and universal control over all phases of radio communication, since the
appropriation of a wave-length, hours of broadcasting and power are
to be governed by civil rights under state control-that control being
absent, as to Congress, in the Act of 1912.
(5) The license has, as its only effect, the avoiding of a penalty
under Section i of the Act of 1912 and does not relieve the licensee
from liability to one who sustains a special injury.
It may now be asked: Is there a common law property right in a
radio wave-length which will protect the broadcaster who may have
no recourse to the Department of Commerce against a later licensee's
usurpation of an appropriated wave-length?
